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Abstract
This paper studies discounted stochastic games perfect or imperfect
public monitoring and the opportunity to conduct voluntary monetary
transfers. We show that for all discount factors every public perfect
equilibrium payoff can be implemented with a simple class of equilibria
that have a stationary structure on the equilibrium path and optimal
penal codes with a stick and carrot structure. We develop algorithms
that exactly compute or approximate the set of equilibrium payoffs and
find simple equilibria that implement these payoffs.
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Introduction

Discounted stochastic games are a natural generalization of infinitely repeated
games that provide a very flexible framework to to study relationships in a
wide variety of applications. Players interact in infinitely many periods and
discount future payoffs with a common discount factor. Payoffs and available
actions in a period depend on a state that can change between periods in a
deterministic or stochastic manner. The probability distribution of the next
period’s state only depends on the state and chosen actions in the current
period. For example, in a long-term principal-agent relationship, a state may
describe the amount of relationship specific capital or the current outside options of each party. In a dynamic oligopoly model, a state may describe the
number of active firms, the production capacity of each firm, or demand and
cost shocks that can be persistent over time.
∗

Department of Economics, University of Bonn and Institute for Energy Economics,
University of Cologne. Email: skranz@uni-bonn.de. I would like to thank the German
Research Foundation (DFG) for financial support through SFB-TR 15 and an individual
research grant. Part of the work was conducted while I was visiting the Cowles Foundation
in Yale. I would like to thank Dirk Bergemann, An Chen, Mehmet Ekmekci, Susanne
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In many relationships of economic interest, parties cannot only perform actions but also have the option to transfer money to each other or to a third
party. Repeated games with observable transfers and risk-neutral players have
been widely studied in the literature.1 Levin (2003) shows for repeated principal agent games with transfers that one can restrict attention to a simple
class of stationary equilibria in order to implement every public perfect equilibrium payoff. Kranz and Goldlücke (2010) derive a similar characterization
for general repeated games with transfers.
This paper extends these results to stochastic games with voluntary transfers
and imperfect monitoring of actions. For any given discount factor δ ∈ [0, 1),
all public perfect equilibrium (PPE) payoffs can be implemented with a simple
class of equilibria. Based on that result, algorithms are developed that allow
to approximate or to exactly compute the set of PPE payoffs.
A simple equilibrium is described by an equilibrium phase and for each player
a punishment phase. In the equilibrium phase the chosen action profile only
depends on the current state, like in a Markov Perfect equilibrium. Voluntary
transfers after the new state has been realized are used to smooth incentive
constraints across players. Play moves to a player’s punishment phase whenever that player refuses to make a required transfer. Punishments have a simple
stick-and-carrot structure: one punishment action profile per player and state
is defined. After the punished profile has been played and subsequent transfers
are conducted, play moves back to the equilibrium phase. We show that for
every discount factor there is an optimal simple equilibrium that implements
in every state the highest joint continuation payoffs (i.e. the sum of payoffs
across all players) in the equilibrium phase and in the punishment phases the
lowest continuation payoff for the punished player that can be achieved by any
simple equilibrium. By varying up-front payments in the very first period, one
can implement every PPE payoff with such an optimal simple equilibrium.
Based on that result, we develop algorithms for games with finite action spaces
that allow to approximate or to exactly compute the set of pure strategy PPE
payoffs and yield (optimal) simple equilibria to implement any payoff. To
compute inner and outer approximations of the PPE payoff set, one can use
decomposition methods, in which attention can be restricted to state-wise
maximal joint continuation payoffs and minimal continuation payoffs for each
player. Sufficiently fine approximations allow to reduce for each state the set
of action profiles that can possibly be part of an optimal simple equilibrium.
If these sets can be sufficiently reduced, a brute force method that solves a
linear optimization for every combination of remaining action profiles allows
to find an optimal simple equilibrium and to exactly compute the set of PPE
payoffs.
If actions can be perfectly monitored, the characterization of optimal simple
1

Examples include employment relations by Levin (2002, 2003) and Malcomson and
MacLeod (1989), partnerships and team production by Doornik (2006) and Rayo (2007),
prisoner dilemma games by Fong and Surti (2009), international trade agreements by Klimenko, Ramey and Watson (2008) and cartels by Harrington and Skrzypacz (2007). Miller
and Watson (2011), Gjertsen et. al (2010), Kranz and Ohlendorf (2009) and Baliga and
Evans (2000) study renegotiation-proof equilibria in repeated games with transfers.
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equilibria substantially simplifies. Decomposition steps just require to evaluate a simple formula for each state and action profile, while under imperfect
monitoring a linear optimization problem has to be solved. Furthermore, we
develop an alternative policy elimination algorithm that exactly computes the
set of pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs by repeatedly solving
a single agent Markov decision problem for the equilibrium phase and a nested
variation of a Markov decision problem for the punishment phases.
In general, the flexibility of discounted stochastic games comes at the price
that solving them entails considerably more difficulties than solving infinitely
repeated games. Finding just a single equilibrium of a stochastic game can
be challenging, while an infinite repetition of the stage game Nash equilibrium is always an equilibrium in a repeated game. Complexities increase when
one wants to determine the set of all equilibrium payoffs. For stochastic games
without transfers and in the limit case as the discount factor converges towards
1, folk theorems have been established by Dutta (1995) for perfect monitoring
and Fudenberg and Yamamoto (2010) and Hörner et. al. (2011) for imperfect
monitoring of actions in irreducible stochastic games. For fixed discount factors
Judd, Yeltekin and Conklin (2003) and Abreu and Sannikov (2011) have developed effective numerical methods, based on the seminal recursive techniques
by Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1990, henceforth APS), to approximate the
equilibrium payoff sets for repeated games with public correlation and perfect
monitoring. In principle, these methods can be extended to general stochastic
games (see, e.g. Sleet and Yeltekin, 2003), but it is still an open question
how tractable such extensions will be in terms of computational requirements,
guidance for closed-form solutions and the ability to deal with imperfect monitoring. This paper shows that in stochastic games with monetary transfers,
one can very effectively handle these issues.
Applied literature that studies stochastic games typically restricts attention
to Markov perfect equilibria (MPE) in which actions only condition on the
current state.2 Voluntary transfers that do not change the state would then
never be conducted. Focusing on MPE has advantages, e.g. strategies have
a simple structure and there exist quick algorithms to find a MPE. However,
there are also drawbacks.
One issue is that the set of MPE payoffs can be very sensitive to the definition
of the state space. For example, a repeated game has by definition just one
state, so only an infinite repetition of the same stage game Nash equilibrium
can be a MPE. Yet, if one specifies a state to be described by the action
profile of the previous period (which may have some small influence on the
current period’s payoff function), also collusive grim-trigger strategies can be
implemented as a MPE.
Another issue is that there are no effective algorithms to compute all MPE
payoffs of stochastic game, even if one just considers pure strategies.3 Ex2

Examples include studies of learning-by-doing by Benkard (2004) and Besanko et. al.
(2010), advertisement dynamics by Doraszelski and Markovich (2007), consumer learning
by Ching (2009), capacity expansion by Besanko and Doraszelski (2004), or network externalities by Markovich and Moenius (2009).
3
For a game with finite action spaces, one could always use a brute-force method that
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isting algorithms, e.g. Pakes & McGuire (1994, 2001), are very effective in
finding one MPE, but except for special games there is no guarantee that it is
unique. Besanko et. al. (2010) illustrate the multiplicity problem and show
how the homotopy method can be used to find multiple MPE. Still there is no
guarantee, however, that all (pure) MPE are found.
For those reasons, effective methods to compute the set of all PPE payoffs and
an implementation with a simple class of strategy profiles generally seem quite
useful in order to complement the analysis of MPE.
While monetary transfers may not be feasible in all social interactions, the possibility of transfers is plausible in many problems of economic interest. Even
for illegal collusion, transfer schemes are in line with the evidence from several actual cartel agreements. For example, the citric acid and lysine cartels
required members that exceeded their sales quota in some period to purchase
the product from their competitors in the next period; transfers were implemented via sales between firms. Harrington and Skrzypacz (2010) describe
transfer schemes used by cartels in more detail and provide further examples.4
Risk-neutrality is also often a sensible approximation, in particular if players are countries or firms or if payments of the stochastic games are small in
comparison to expected lifetime income and individuals have access to well
functioning financial markets. Even in contexts in which transfers or riskneutrality may be considered strong assumptions, our results can be useful
since the set of implementable PPE payoffs with transfers provides an upper
bound on payoffs that can be implemented by equilibria without transfers or
under risk-aversion.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the model and
defines simple strategy profiles. Section 3 first provides an intuitive overview
of how transfers facilitate the analysis. It is then shown that every PPE can
be implemented with simple equilibria. Section 4 describes algorithms that
allow to approximate or exactly compute the set of pure strategy PPE payoffs.
Section 5 shows how the results simplify for games with perfect monitoring and
develops an alternative algorithm that exploits these simplifications. Section 6
illustrates with examples how numerical or analytical solutions can be obtained
with the developed methods. All proofs are relegated to an Appendix.
checks for every pure strategy Markov strategy profile whether it constitutes
a MPE. Yet,
Q
the number of Markov strategy profiles increases very fast: is given by x∈X |A(x)|, where
|A(x)| is the number of strategy profiles in state x. This renders a brute force method
practically infeasible except for very small stochastic games.
4
Further examples of cartels with transfers schemes include the choline chloride, organic
peroxides, sodium gluconate, sorbates, vitamins, and zinc phosphate cartels. Interesting
detailed descriptions can also be obtained from older cases, in which cartel members more
openly documented their collusive agreements. An example is the Supreme Court decision
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. U. S., 175 U.S. 211 (1899). It describes the details of a
bid-rigging cartel in which a firm that won a contract had to make payment to the other
cartel members.
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2

Model and Simple Strategy Profiles

2.1

Model

We consider an n player stochastic game of the following form. There are
infinitely many periods and future payoffs are discounted with a common discount factor δ ∈ [0, 1). There is a finite set of states X and x0 ∈ X denotes
the initial state. A period is comprised of two stages: a transfer stage and an
action stage. There is no discounting between stages.
In a transfer stage, every player simultaneously chooses a non-negative vector
of transfers to all other players. To have a compact strategy space, we assume
that a player’s transfers cannot exceed some finite upper bound. Yet, we
assume that this upper bound is large enough to be never binding given the
constraint that transfers must be voluntary. Players also have the option to
transfer money to a non-involved third party, which has the same effect as
burning money.5 Transfers are perfectly monitored.
In the action stage, players simultaneously choose actions. In state x ∈ X,
player i can choose a pure action ai from a finite or compact action set Ai (x).
The set of pure action profiles in state x is denoted by A(x) = A1 (x) × ... ×
An (x).
After actions have been conducted, a signal y from a finite signal space Y
and a new state x0 ∈ X are drawn by nature and commonly observed by all
players. We denote by φ(y, x0 |x, a) the probability that signal y and state x0
are drawn; it depends only on the current state x and the chosen action profile
a. Player i’s stage game payoff is denoted by π̂i (ai , y, x) and depends on the
signal y, player i’s action ai and the initial state x. We denote by πi (a, x) player
i’s expected stage game payoff in state x if action profile a is played. If the
action space in state x is compact then stage game payoffs and the probability
distribution of signals and new states shall be continuous in the action profile
a.
We assume that players are risk-neutral and that payoffs are additively separable in the stage game payoff and money. This means that the expected payoff
of player i in a period with state x, in which she makes a net transfer of pi and
action profile a has been played, is given by πi (a, x) − pi .
When referring to (continuation) payoffs of the stochastic game, we mean
expected average discounted continuation payoffs, i.e. the expected sum of
continuation payoffs multiplied by (1 − δ). A payoff function u : X → Rn
maps every state into a vector of payoffs for each player. We generally use
upper case letters to denote joint payoffs of all players, e.g.
U=

n
X

ui .

i=1
5

An extension to the case without money burning is possible if one allows for a public
correlation device. Instead of burning money, players will coordinate with positive probability a continuation equilibrium that minimizes the sum of continuation payoffs. In a similar
fashion as in Goldlücke and Kranz’s (2010) analysis for repeated games, one can provide a
characterization with an extended class of simple equilibria.
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We study the payoff sets of pure strategy equilibria and for finite action spaces
we also consider the case that players can mix over actions. If equilibria with
mixed actions are considered, A(x) shall denote the set of mixed action profiles
at the action stage in state x otherwise A(x) = A(x) shall denote the set of
pure action profiles. For a mixed action profile α ∈ A(x), we denote by
πi (α, x) player i’s expected stage game payoff taking expectations over mixing
probabilities and signal realizations.
A public history of the stochastic game describes the sequence of all states,
public signals and monetary transfers that have occurred before a given point
in time. A public strategy σi of player i in the stochastic game maps every
public history that ends before the action stage into a possibly mixed action
αi ∈ Ai (x), and every public history that ends before a payment stage into a
vector of monetary transfers. A public perfect equilibrium is a profile of public
strategies that constitutes mutual best replies after every history. We restrict
attention to public perfect equilibria.
A vector α that assigns an action profile α(x) ∈ A(x) to every state x ∈ X is
called a policy and A = ×x∈X A(x) denotes the set of all policies. For briefness
sake, we abbreviate an action profile α(x) by the policy α if it is clear which
action profile is selected, e.g. π(α, x) ≡ π(α(x), x).

2.2

Simple strategy profiles

We now describe the structure of simple strategy profiles. In a simple strategy
profile, it will never be the case that a player at the same time makes and
receives transfers. We therefore describe transfers by the net payments that
players make.6
A simple strategy profile is characterized by n+2 phases. Play starts in the upfront transfer phase, in which players are required to make up-front transfers
described by net payments p0 . Afterwards, play can be in one of n + 1 phases,
which we index by k ∈ {e, 1, 2, ..., n}. We call the phase k = e the equilibrium
phase and k = i ∈ {1, ..., n} the punishment phase of player i.
A simple strategy profile specifies for each phase k ∈ {e, 1, 2, ..., n} and state
x an action profile αk (x) ∈ A(x). We refer to αe as the equilibrium phase
policy and to αi as the punishment policy for player i. From period 2 onwards,
required net transfers are described by net payments pk (y, x0 , x) that depend
6

Any vector of net payments p can be mapped into a matrix of gross transfers p̃ij from i
to j as follows. Denote by IP = {i|pi > 0} the set of net payers and by IR = {i|pi ≤ 0} ∪ {0}
the set of net receivers including the sink for burned money indexed by 0. For any receiver
j ∈ IR , we denote by
|pj |
sj = P
j∈IR |pj |
the share she receives from the total amount that is transferred or burned and assume that
each net payer distributes her gross transfers according to these proportions

sj pi if i ∈ IP and j ∈ IR
p̃ij =
0
otherwise.
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on the current phase k, the realized signal y, the realized state x0 and the
previous state x. The collection of all policies (αk )k and all payment functions
(pk (.))k for all phases k ∈ {e, 1, ..., n} are called action plan and payment plan,
respectively.
The transitions between phases are simple. If no player unilaterally deviates
from a required transfer, play transits to the equilibrium phase: k = e. If
player i unilaterally deviates from a required transfer, play transits to the
punishment phase of player i, i.e. k = i. In all other situations the phase does
not change. A simple equilibrium is a simple strategy profile that constitutes
a public perfect equilibrium of the stochastic game.

3

Characterization with simple equilibria

This section first provides some intuition and then derives the main result
that all PPE payoffs can be implemented with simple equilibria. It is helpful
to think of three ways in which monetary transfers simplify the analysis:
1. Upfront transfers in the very first period allow flexible distribution of the
joint equilibrium payoffs.
2. Transfers in later periods allow to balance incentive constraints between
players.
3. The payment of fines allows to settle punishments within one period.

3.1

Distributing with upfront transfers

Consider Figure 1. The shaded area shall illustrate for a two player stochastic
game with fixed discount factor all payoffs of PPE that do not use upfront
transfers. The set is assumed to be compact. The point ū is the equilibrium
payoff with the highest sum of payoffs for both players.
If one could impose enforceable upfront transfers without any liquidity constraints, the set of Pareto-optimal payoffs would be simply given by a line
with slope −1 through this point. If upfront transfers must be incentive compatible, their maximum size is bounded by the harshest punishment that can
be credibly imposed on a player that deviates from a required transfers. The
harshest credible punishment for player i = 1, 2 is given by the continuation
equilibrium after the first transfer stage that has the lowest payoff for player
i. The idea to punish any deviation with the worst continuation equilibrium
for the deviator is the crux of Abreu’s (1988) optimal penal codes.
Points w1 and w2 in Figure 1 illustrate these worst equilibria for each player
and v̄ is the point where each coordinate i = 1, 2 describes the worst payoff
of player i. The Pareto frontier of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs with
voluntary upfront transfers is given by the shown line segment through point
ū with slope −1 that is bounded by the lowest equilibrium payoff v̄1 of player
1 at the left and the lowest equilibrium payoff v̄2 of player 2 at the bottom.
7

If we allow for money burning in upfront transfers, any point in the depicted
triangle can be implemented in an incentive compatible way. That intuition
naturally extends to n player games.
u2

ū
w1

v̄

w2
u1

Figure 1: Distributing with upfront transfers
Proposition 1. Assume that across all PPE that do not use transfers in the
first period there exists a highest joint payoff Ū and for every player i = 1, ..., n
a lowest payoff v̄i . Then the set of PPE payoffs with transfers in the first period
is the simplex
{u ∈ Rn |

n
X

ui ≤ Ū and ui ≥ v̄i }.

i=1

That highest joint payoffs Ū and lowest payoffs v̄i always exist is formally
shown in Theorem 1 and not very surprising given the compactness result for
the payoff sets of repeated games by APS. The set of PPE is thus defined by
just n + 1 real numbers: the highest joint PPE payoff Ū and the lowest PPE
payoffs v̄i for every player i = 1, ..., n.

3.2

Balancing incentive constraints

We now illustrate how transfers in later periods can be used to balance incentive constraints between players. Consider an infinitely repeated asymmetric
prisoner’s dilemma game described by the following payoff matrix:
C
D

C
D
4,2 -3,6
5,-1 0,1

The goal shall be to implement mutual cooperation (C, C) in every period
on the equilibrium path. Since the stage game Nash equilibrium yields the
min-max payoff for both players, grim trigger punishments constitute optimal
8

penal codes: any deviation is punished by playing forever the stage game Nash
equilibrium (D, D).
No transfers First consider the case that no transfers are conducted. Given

grim-trigger punishments, player 1 and 2 have no incentive to deviate from
cooperation on the equilibrium path whenever the following conditions are
satisfied:
Player 1: 4 ≥ (1 − δ)5
⇔ δ ≥ 0.2,
Player 2: 2 ≥ (1 − δ)6 +δ ⇔ δ ≥ 0.8.
The condition is tighter for player 2 than for player 1 for three reasons:
i) player 2 gets a lower payoff on the equilibrium path (2 vs 4),
ii) player 2 gains more in the period of defection (6 vs 5),
iii) player 2 is better off in each period of the punishment (1 vs 0).

Given such asymmetries, it is not necessarily optimal to repeat the same action
profile in every period. For example, if the discount factor is δ = 0.7, it is not
possible to implement mutual cooperation in every period, but one can show
that there is a SPE with non-stationary equilibrium path in which in every
fourth period (C, D) is played instead of (C, C). Such a strategy profile relaxes
the tight incentive constraint of player 2, by giving her a higher equilibrium
path payoff. The incentive constraint for player 1 is tightened, but there is
still sufficiently much slack left.
Note that even if players have access to a public correlation device, stationary
equilibrium paths will not always be optimal.7
With transfers Assume now that (C, C) is played in every period and from

to player 2 in each period
period 2 onwards player 1 transfers an amount of 1.5
δ
on the equilibrium path. Using the one shot deviation property, it suffices to
check that no player has an incentive for a one shot deviation from the actions
7

For an example, consider the following stage game:
A
B

A

B

0,0
3,-1

-1,3
0,0

Using a public correlation device to mix with equal probability between the profiles (A, B)
and (B, A) on the equilibrium path and punishing deviations with infinite repetition of the
stage game Nash equilibrium (B, B) constitutes a SPE whenever δ ≥ 21 . One can easily
show that no other action profile with a stationary equilibrium path can sustain positive
expected payoffs for any discount factor below 12 . Yet, a non-stationary equilibrium path
{(A, B), (B, A), (A, B), ...} that deterministically alternates between (A, B) and (B, A) can
be implemented for every δ ≥ 13 . The reason is that when the profile (A, B) shall be
played, only player 1 has an incentive to deviate. It is thus beneficial to give her a higher
continuation payoff than player 2 and the reverse holds true if (B, A) shall be played. Unlike
the stationary path, the non-stationary path has the feature that the player who currently
has higher incentives to deviate gets a higher continuation payoff. Applying the results
below, one can moreover establish that for δ < 13 , one cannot implement any joint payoff
above 0, even if one would allow for monetary transfers.

9

or the transfers. Player 1 has no incentive to deviate from the transfers on the
equilibrium path if and only if8
(1 − δ) ∗ 1.5 ≤ δ ∗ (4 − 1.5) ⇔ δ ≥ 0.375
and there is no profitable one shot deviation from the cooperative actions if
and only if
Player 1: 4 − 1.5 ≥ (1 − δ)5
⇔ δ ≥ 0.5,
Player 2: 2 + 1.5 ≥ (1 − δ)6 +δ ⇔ δ ≥ 0.5.
The incentive constraints between the players are now perfectly balanced. Indeed, if we sum both players’ incentive constraints
Joint: 4 + 2 ≥ (1 − δ)(5 + 6) + δ(0 + 1) ⇔ δ ≥ 0.5.
we find the same critical discount factor as for the individual constraints.
Intuitively, our formal results below show that in general stochastic games
incentive constraints can always be perfectly balanced. This result is crucial
for being able to restrict attention to simple equilibria and also facilitates
computation of optimal equilibria within the class of simple equilibria.

3.3

Intuition for fines and stick-and-carrot punishments

If transfers are not possible, optimally deterring a player from deviations can
become a very complicated problem. Basically, if players observe a deviation
or an imperfect signal that is very likely under a profitable deviation, they
have to coordinate on future actions that yield a sufficiently low payoff for the
deviator. The punishments must themselves be stable against deviations and
have to take into account how states can change on the desired path of play or
after any deviation. Under imperfect monitoring, suspicious signals can also
arise on the equilibrium path, which means “punishments” in Pareto optimal
equilibria must entail as low efficiency losses as possible.
The benefits of transfers for simplifying optimal punishments are easiest seen
for the case of pure strategy equilibria under perfect monitoring. Instead of
conducting harmful punishment actions, one can always give the deviator the
possibility to pay a fine that is as costly as if the punishment actions were
conducted. If the fine is paid, one can move back to efficient equilibrium path.
Punishment actions must only be conducted if a deviator fails to pay a fine.
After one period of punishment actions, one can again give the punished player
the chance to move back to efficient equilibrium path play if she pays a fine
that will be as costly as the remaining punishment. This is the key intuition
for why optimal penal codes can be characterized with stick-and-carrot type
punishments with a single punishment action profile per player and state.9
8

To derive the condition, it is useful to think of transfers taking place at the end of the
current period but discount them by δ. Indeed, one could introduce an additional transfer
stage at the end of period (assuming the new state would be already known in that stage)
and show that the set of PPE payoffs would not change.
9
That transfers can balance incentive constraints among several punishing players is also
relevant for the result that stick-and-carrot punishments always suffice.

10

If monitoring is imperfect or mixed strategies are used, deviations from prescribed actions may not be perfectly detected so that there is no clear notion of
a fine. Still one can impose higher payments under signals that are relatively
more likely under profitable deviations than on the equilibrium path.
There can be signals, like a project-failure in a team production setting, that
indicate that some player has deviated but are not informative about which
player deviated. In such cases it can be necessary to punish with a jointly
inefficient continuation equilibrium. In our framework, such joint inefficiencies
can be implemented via money burning.10

3.4

Formal characterization

The one shot deviation property establishes that a profile of public strategies
is a PPE if and only if after no public history any player has a profitable one
shot deviation. Consider the continuation play of a PPE after some history
ending before the action stage in state x. First a (possibly mixed) action
profile α ∈ A(x) is played and then, when state x0 arises and signal y is
observed, payments p(x0 , y) are conducted. Expected continuation payoffs after
the payment stage, in case no player deviates, shall be denoted by ui (x0 , y).
Let vi (x0 ) denote the infimum of player i’s continuation payoffs if she deviates
from a required payment pi (x0 , y) in state x0 . We will call vi (x0 ) player i’s
punishment payoff in state x0 .
Player i has no incentive for a one shot deviation from any pure action ai in
the support of αi if and only if the following action constraints are satisfied for
all ai ∈ supp(αi ) and all âi ∈ Ai (x)
(1 − δ)πi (ai , α−i , x) + δE[ui (x0 , y) − (1 − δ)pi (x0 , y)|x, ai , α−i ] ≥
(1 − δ)πi (âi , α−i , x) + δE[ui (x0 , y) − (1 − δ)pi (x0 , y)|x, âi , α−i ].
(AC)
The following payment constraint is a necessary condition that player i has no
incentive to deviate from required payments after the action stage
(1 − δ)pi (x0 , y) ≤ ui (x0 , y) − vi (x0 ).

(PC)

Since there is no external funding, it must also be the case that the sum of
payments are non-negative
n
X

pi (x0 , y) ≥ 0.

(BC)

i=1

This sum of payments is simply the total amount of money that is burned.
We say an action profile α ∈ A(x) is implemented in state x with a payment
function p given continuation and punishment payoffs u and v if the constraints
(AC),(PC) and (BC) are satisfied.
10

Alternatively, if players would have a public correlation device, one could coordinate
with some probability to a continuation equilibrium with low joint continuation payoffs in
a similar fashion as Goldlücke and Kranz (2010) describe for repeated games.
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Lemma 1. Assume α is implemented in state x with a payment function p
given continuation and punishment payoffs u and v then α is also implemented
by the payment function
ũi (x0 ) − ui (x0 )
p̃i (x , y) = pi (x , y) +
1−δ
0

0

given continuation and punishment payoffs ũ and ṽ that satisfy vi (x0 ) ≥ ṽi (x0 ),
ũ(y, x0 ) ≥ ṽi (x0 ) and
n
X

ũi (x0 , y) ≥

i=1

n
X

ui (x0 , y)∀x0 , y.

i=1

Lemma 1 states that it becomes easier to implement an action profile if the
sum of continuation payoffs gets larger or the punishment payoffs of any player
are reduced in any state. The payments p̃ in Lemma 1 are chosen such that
player i’s expected continuation payoff
E[ui (x0 , y) − (1 − δ)pi (x0 , y)|x, ai , α−i ]
given the information available at the action stage are the same for ũ and p̃ as
for u and p, no matter which action profile is played. This means transforming
the original PPE by replacing the payments by p̃ and subsequent continuation
payoffs by ũ does not change incentives for a one shot deviation at any prior
point of time.
If players’ actions can only be imperfectly monitored, it is sometimes only
possible to implement an action profile α for given u and v if after some signals
money is burned. We denote by
Û (x, α, u, v) = max((1 − δ)Πi (α, x) + δE[U (x0 , y) − (1 − δ)
p

n
X

pi (x0 , y)|x, α])

i=1

s.t.(AC),(PC),(BC)

(LP-e)

the highest expected continuation payoff that can be achieved if an action
profile α shall be implemented in state x given continuation and punishment
payoffs u and v. For the punishment phases, we similarly denote by
v̂i (x, α, u, v) = min
((1 − δ)πi (α, x) + δE[ui (x0 , y) − (1 − δ)pi (x0 , y)|x, α])
p
s.t.(AC),(PC),(BC)

(LP-i)

the minimum expected payoff that can be imposed on player i if an action
profile α shall be implemented. (LP-e) and (LP-i) are just linear optimization
problems.
Lemma 1 guarantees that if two payoff functions u and ũ have the same joint
payoffs U and satisfy u, ũ ≥ v then (LP-k) has the same solution for u and
ũ. With slight abuse of notation we will therefore write these solutions as
functions of joint payoffs U , i.e. as Û (x, α, U, v) and v̂i (x, α, U, v), respectively. If joint continuation payoffs are below joint punishment payoffs in some
state x0 ∈ X, i.e. U (x0 ) < V (x0 ), or no solution to (LP-k) exists, we set
Û (x, α, U, v) = −∞ and v̂i (x, α, U, v) = ∞, respectively. The next result is
also direct consequence of Lemma 1.
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Lemma 2. For all i, j = 1, ..., n and all x0 , x ∈ X
• Û (x, α, U, v) is weakly increasing in U (x0 ) and weakly decreasing in vj (x0 ),
• v̂i (x, α, U, v) is weakly decreasing in U (x0 ) and weakly increasing in vj (x0 ).
Lemma 2 states that higher joint continuation payoffs or lower punishment
payoffs in any state x0 allow to implement higher joint payoffs Û (.) and lower
punishment payoffs v̂i (.). Reminiscent to the decomposition methods by APS,
one can interpret Û (x, α, U, v) as the highest joint payoffs and v̂i (x, α, U, v) as
the lowest payoff for player i that can be decomposed in state x with an action
profile α given a continuation payoff whose highest joint payoffs for each state
are given by U and lowest payoffs for each state and player by v. Lemma
2 loosely corresponds to the fact that in APS the set of payoffs that can be
decomposed gets weakly larger if the set of continuation payoffs gets larger.
Let A(x, U, v) ⊂ A(x) be the subset of action profiles that can be implemented
in state x given U and v for some payment function. This means solutions to
LP-e and LP-i exist if and only if α ∈ A(x, U, v).
Lemma 3. The set of implementable action profiles A(x, U, v) is compact
and upper-hemi continuous in U and v. Û (x, α, U, v) and v̂i (x, α, U, v) are
continuous in α for all α ∈ A(x, U, v).
We can now establish our key result that there exists optimal simple equilibria
that can implement any PPE payoff.
Theorem 1. Assume a PPE exists. Then an optimal simple equilibrium with
an action plan (ᾱk )k exists such that by varying its upfront transfers in an
incentive compatible way, every PPE payoff can be implemented. The sets of
PPE continuation payoffs for every state x are compact; their maximal joint
continuation payoffs and minimal punishment payoffs satisfy
Ū (x) = Û (x, ᾱe , Ū , v̄)∀x,
v̄i (x) = v̂i (x, ᾱi , Ū , v̄)∀x, i.

4

Computing Payoff Sets and Optimal Simple
Equilibria

Based on the previous results, this section describes different methods to exactly compute or to approximate the set of PPE payoffs and to find (optimal)
simple equilibria to implement these payoffs.
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4.1

Optimal payment plans and a brute force algorithm

For a given simple strategy profile, we denote expected continuation payoffs
in the equilibrium phase and the punishment phase for player i by us and vis ,
respectively. The equilibrium phase payoff are implicitly defined by
usi (x) = (1 − δ)πi (αe , x) + δE[−(1 − δ)pei (x0 , y, x) + usi (x0 )|αe , x]).

(1)

Player i’s punishment payoffs are given by
vis (x) = (1 − δ)πi (αi , x) + δE[−(1 − δ)pii (x0 , y, x) + usi (x0 )|αi , x]).

(2)

Let (AC-k), (PC-k) and (BC-k) denote the action payment and budget constraints for policy αk and payment function pk (.) given continuation and punishment payoffs us and v s .
We say a payment plan is optimal for a given action plan if all constraints
(AC-k), (PC-k) and (BC-k) are satisfied and there is no other payment plan
that satisfies these conditions and yields a higher joint payoff U s (x) or a lower
punishment payoff vis (x) for some state x and some player i.
Proposition 2. There exists a simple equilibrium with an action plan (αk )k
if and only if there exists a payment plan (p̄k )k that solves the following linear
program
(p̄ )k ∈ arg max
k
k

(p )k

n
XX

(usi (x) − vis (x))

(LP-OPP)

x∈X i=1

s.t.(AC-k),(PC-k),(BC-k)∀k = e, 1, ..., n
(p̄k )k is an optimal payment plan for (αk )k . A simple equilibrium with action
plan (αk )k and an optimal payment plan satisfies
U s (x) = Û (x, αe , U s , v s ),
vis (x) = v̂i (x, αi , U s , v s ).
An optimal simple equilibrium has an optimal action plan and a corresponding
optimal payment plan. Together with Theorem 1, this result directly leads to
a brute force algorithm to characterize the set of pure strategy PPE payoffs
given a finite action space: simply go through all possible action plans and solve
(LP-OPP). An action plan with the largest solution will be optimal. Similarly,
one can obtain a lower bound on the set of mixed strategy PPE payoffs, by
solving (LP-OPP) for all mixing probabilities from some finite grid. Despite
an infinite number of mixed action plans, the optimization problem for each
mixed action plan is finite because only deviations to pure actions have to be
checked.
The weakness of this method is that it can become computationally infeasible,
already for moderately sized action and state spaces. That is because the
number of possible action plans grows very quickly in the number of states
and actions per state and player.
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For particular applications there will exist more efficient methods to jointly
optimize over payment and action plans than a brute force search over all action
plans. In general, however, the joint optimization problem is non-convex, as
e.g. joint equilibrium phase payoffs U s are not jointly concave in the actions
and payments. One can therefore not in general rely on efficient methods for
convex optimization problems that guarantee a global optimum. For mixed
strategy equilibria, there is the additional complication that number of action
constraints depends on the support of the mixed action profiles that shall be
implemented.

4.2

Decomposition Methods for Outer and Inner Approximations

In this subsection we illustrate how the methods for repeated games of APS
and Judd, Yeltekin and Conklin (2003, henceforth JYC) can be translated to
our framework to get an algorithm that allows outer and inner approximations
of the equilibrium payoff set.
Let D : R(n+1)|X| → R(n+1)|X| be a decomposition operator that maps a collection (U, v) of joint equilibrium and punishment payoffs into a new collection
of of such payoffs (U 0 , v 0 ) that satisfy for each state x ∈ X:
U 0 (x) =
0

vi (x) =

max Û (x, α, U, v),

(3)

min v̂i (x, α, U, v).

(4)

α∈A(x)
α∈A(x)

This means D computes the largest joint equilibrium payoff and lowest punishment payoffs that can be decomposed with any action profiles α ∈ A(x).
For any integer m, we denote by Dm the operator that m times applies D.
Proposition 3. Let U 0 and v 0 be payoffs satisfying U 0 (x) ≥ Ū (x) and vi0 (x) ≤
v̄i (x) for all x ∈ X and all i = 1, ..., n. Then the resulting payoffs after m
decomposition steps, i.e. Dm (U 0 , v 0 ), converge to Ū (from above) and v̄ (from
below) as m → ∞.
Repeatedly applying the decomposition operator D yields in every round a
tighter outer approximation for Ū and v̄ and of the corresponding payoff set
of PPE equilibria.
A tighter outer approximation is obtained more quickly if the initial values
U 0 and v 0 are closer to Ū and v̄. For games with imperfect monitoring, good
initial values U 0 and v 0 will be the optimal joint equilibrium and punishment
payoffs of a perfect monitoring version of the game, which can be solved much
faster using methods that will be described in Section 5.
To obtain bounds on the approximation error, it is also necessary to obtain
inner approximations of the equilibrium payoff sets. To find an inner approximation for the payoff set of a repeated game, JYC suggest to shrink the outer
approximation of the payoff set by a small amount, say 2%-3% and to apply
the decomposition operator on the shrinked set. If the decomposition operator
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increases the shrinked set then the decomposed set forms an inner approximation of the equilibrium payoff set.
A similar approach can be used in our framework. One reduces the outer
approximations of Ū and increases the outer approximations of v̄ by a small
amount and then applies the decomposition operator D on these shrinked values. If the decomposition increases all joint equilibrium payoffs and reduces all
punishment payoffs, we have found an inner approximation. For each decomposition step, we get a corresponding action plan consisting of the optimizers
of (3) and (4). Propoposition 4 shows that for this action plan the linear program (LP-OPP) always has a solution. We obtain from that solution a simple
equilibrium and an even tighter inner approximation.
Proposition 4. There exists a simple equilibrium with an action plan (αk )k
if and only if there exists joint equilibrium and punishment payoffs U and v
such that
Û (x, αe , U, v) ≥ U (x)∀x ∈ X,
v̂i (x, αi , U, v) ≤ vi (x)∀x ∈ X, i = 1, ..., n.

(5)
(6)

An alternative method to search for an inner approximation is to run (LPOPP) for the action plans that result from the decomposition steps of the outer
approximation. If a solution exists, it also forms an inner approximation.
Inner and outer approximations allow to reduce for every state and phase
the set of action profiles that can possible be part of an optimal action plan.
Let (U in , v in ) and (U out , v out ) describe the inner and outer approximations.
Consider a state x and an action profile α ∈ A(x). If α cannot be implemented
given U out and v out , there does not exist any PPE in which α is played and we
can dismiss it. If α can be implemented, but
Û (x, α, U out , v out ) < U in (x)
then α will not be played in the equilibrium phase in state x of an optimal
equilibrium, since even with the outer approximations of U and v it can decompose a lower joint payoff than the current inner approximation. Similarly,
if
v̂i (x, α, U out , v out ) > viin (x)
then α will not be an optimal punishment profile for player i in state x.
Hence, finer inner and outer approximations speed up the computation of new
approximations since a smaller set of action profiles has to be considered.
Moreover, once the number of candidate action profiles has been sufficiently
reduced, it can become tractable to compute the exact payoff set by applying
the brute force method from Subsection 4.1 on the remaining action plans.

5
5.1

Perfect monitoring
Decomposition

In this section, attention is restricted to equilibria in pure strategies in games
with perfect monitoring, i.e. players commonly observe all past action profiles.
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The following proposition shows how the problems (LP-k) drastically simplify
in this case.
Proposition 5. Assume monitoring is perfect, a is a pure strategy profile, and
U (x0 ) ≥ V (x0 )∀x0 ∈ X. Then
1. all solutions to (LP-e) satisfy
Û (a, x, U, v) = (1 − δ)Π(a, x) + δE[U (x0 )|a, x],

(7)

2. all solutions to (LP-i) satisfy
v̂i (a, x, U, v) = max {(1 − δ)πi (âi , a−i , x) + δE[vi (x0 )|âi , a, x]},
âi ∈Ai (x)

(8)

3. a solution to (LP-k) for given a, x, U and v exists if and only if
(1 − δ)Π(a, x) + δE[U (x0 )|a, x] ≥
n
X
i=1

max {(1 − δ)πi (âi , a−i , x) + δE[vi (x0 )|âi , a−i , x]}. (9)

âi ∈Ai (x)

These results are quite intuitive. Since deviations can be perfectly observed,
there is no need to burn money on the equilibrium path. Equation (7) simply
describes the joint continuation payoffs in the absence of money burning. Furthermore, perfect monitoring allows in punishment phases, to always reduce
the punished player’s payoff to his best reply payoff given that continuation
payoffs are given by v. These best-reply payoffs are given by (8). Condition
(9) is the sum of the resulting action constraints across all players. That this
condition is sufficient is due to the fact that payments can be used to perfectly balance incentives to deviate across players in the way Section 3.2 has
exemplified.
Proposition 5 allows a quick implementation of the decomposition steps to find
inner and outer approximations described in Section 4. For a decomposition
step one just has to evaluate conditions (9) and (7) or (8) for the candidate
set of possibly optimal action profiles; no linear optimization problem has to
be solved.

5.2

Simple Equilibria with Optimal Payment Plans

We now show, how for a given action plan one can compute joint equilibrium
payoffs and punishment payoffs under an optimal payment plan. Assume a
simple equilibrium exists for an action plan (ak )k . Recall from Proposition 2
that
Û (ae (x), x, U s , v s ) = U s (x).
Together with (9) , we find that U s can be easily computed by solving the
following system of linear equations:
U s = (1 − δ)Π(ae ) + Ω(ae )U s
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(10)

where Ω(a) shall denote the transition matrix between states given that players
follow the policy a.
For the punishment states, Propositions 2 and 5 imply that punishment payoffs
must satisfy the following Bellman equation:




vis (x) = max {(1 − δ) πi (âi , ai−i , x) + δE[vis (x0 )|x, âi , ai−i ]}.
âi ∈Ai (x)

(11)

It follows from the contraction mapping theorem that there exists a unique
payoff vector vis that solves this Bellman equation. The solution corresponds
to player i’s payoffs in case she refuses to make any payments and plays a best
reply in every period assuming that other players follow the policy ai−i in all
future.
Finding player i’s punishment payoffs constitutes a single agent dynamic optimization problem, more precisely, a discounted Markov decision process. One
can compute vis , for example, with the policy iteration algorithm.11 It consists
of a policy improvement step and a value determination step. The policy improvement step calculates for some punishment payoffs vi an optimal best-reply
action ãi (x) for each state x, which solves




ãi (x) ∈ arg max {(1 − δ) πi (ai , ai−i , x) + δE[vi (x0 )|x, ai , ai−i ]}.
ai ∈Ai (x)

The value determination step calculates the corresponding payoffs of player i
by solving the system of linear equations
vi = (1 − δ)πi (ãi , ai−i ) + δΩ(ãi , ai−i )vi .

(12)

Starting with some arbitrary payoff function vi , the policy iteration algorithm
alternates between policy step and value iteration step until the payoffs do not
change anymore, in which case they will satisfy (11).
Together with Propositions 2 and 5 these observations lead to the following
result:
Corollary 1. Under perfect monitoring, the joint equilibrium payoffs U s and
player i’s punishment payoffs vis in a simple equilibrium with (pure) action
plan (ak )k and an optimal payment plan are given by the solutions of (10) and
(11), respectively. A simple equilibrium with action plan (ak )k exists if and
only if for every state x and every phase k ∈ {e, 1, ..., n}
(1 − δ)Π(ak , x) + δE[U s (x)|ak , x] ≥
n
X
i=1

max {(1 − δ)πi (âi , ak−i , x) + δE[vis (x0 )|âi , ak−i (x), x]}. (13)

âi ∈Ai (x)

When applying the methods described in Section 4, Corollary 1 is useful for
computing inner approximations and to find an optimal simple equilibrium
once the candidate set of action plans has been sufficiently reduced.
11

For details on policy iteration, convergence speed and alternative computation methods
to solve Markov Decision Processes, see e.g. Puterman (1994).
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5.3

A Policy Elimination Algorithm

We now develop a quick policy elimination algorithm that exactly computes the
set of pure strategy SPE payoffs in stochastic games with perfect monitoring
and a finite action space.
In every round of the algorithm there is a candidate set of action profiles
Â(x) ⊂ A(x) which have not yet been ruled out as being possible played in
some simple equilibrium. Â = ×x∈X Â(x) shall denote the corresponding set of
policies. Let U s (.|ae ) denote the solution of (10) for equilibrium phase policy
ae and vis (.|ai ) the solution of (11) under punishment policy ai . We denote by
U s (x|Â) = max U s (x|ae )

(14)

ae ∈Â

the maximum joint payoff that can be implemented in state x using equilibrium
phase policies from Â. The problem of computing U e (.|Â) is a finite discounted
Markov decision process (MDP). Standard results for MDP establish that there
always exists a policy âe (Â) ∈ Â that solves (14) simultaneously in all states.
One can compute U e (.|Â) with a policy iteration algorithm, for which the
value determination step is given by (10).
For the punishment phases, we define by
vis (x|Â) = min vis (x|ai )

(15)

ai ∈Â

player i’s minimal punishment payoff in state x across all punishment policies
in Â. Computing vis (x|Â) constitutes a nested dynamic optimization problem:
one has to compute player i’s best-reply policy against each considered candidate punishment policy. The analysis of this problem is relegated to Appendix
A. It is shown that there always exists a punishment policy âi (Â) ∈ Â that
solves (15) simultaneously for all states x ∈ X and a nested policy iteration
method is developed that strictly improves punishment policies in each step
and allows to quickly compute vi (.|Â).
The policy elimination algorithm works as follows:
Algorithm. Policy elimination algorithm to find optimal action plans
0

0. Let r = 0 and initially consider all policies as candidates: Â = A
r

1. Compute U s (.|Â ) and a corresponding optimal equilibrium phase policy
r
âe (Â )
r

2. For every player i compute vis (.|Â ) and a corresponding optimal punr
ishment policy âi (Â )
r+1

3. For every state x, let Â (x) be the set of all action profiles that satr
r
isfy condition (9) from Proposition (5) using U s (.|Â ) and vis (.|Â ) as
equilibrium phase and punishment payoffs.
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r

r+1

4. Stop if the optimal policies âk (Â ) are contained in Â . They then
constitute an optimal action plan. Also stop if for some state x the
r+1
set Â
is empty. Then no SPE in pure strategies exists. Increment
the round r and repeat Steps 1-3 until one of the stopping conditions is
satisfied.
The policy elimination algorithm always stops in a finite number of rounds.
It either finds an optimal action plan (āk )k or yields the result that no SPE
in pure strategies exists. Given our previous results, it is straightforward that
this algorithm works.
Unless the algorithm stops in the current round, Step 3 always eliminates some
r
candidate policies, i.e. the set of candidate policies Â gets strictly smaller
r
r
with each round. Therefore U s (x|Â ) weakly decreases and vis (x|Â ) weakly
increases each round. Condition (9) is easier satisfied for higher values of
r
r
U s (x|Â ) and for lower values of v s (x|Â ). Therefore, a necessary condition
that an action profile is ever played in a simple equilibrium is that it surr
vives Step 3. Conversely, if the polices âk (Â ) all survive Step 3, it follows
from Corollary 1 that a simple equilibrium with these policies exists. That
they constitute an optimal action plan simply follows again from the fact that
r
r
U s (x|Â ) weakly decreases and vis (x|Â ) weakly increases each round. That
the algorithm terminates in a finite number of round is a consequence of the
r
finite action space and the fact that the set of possible policies Â gets strictly
smaller each round.

6
6.1

Examples
Quantity competition with stochastic reserves

As first example, we consider a stochastic game version of the example Cournot
used to motivate his famous model of quantity competition. There are two
producers of mineral water producers who have finite water reserves in their
reservoirs. A state is two dimensional x = (x1 , x2 ) and xi describes the amount
of water currently stored in firm i’s reservoir. In each period, each firm i
simultaneously chooses an integer amount of water ai ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., xi } that it
takes from its reservoir and sells on the market. Market prices are given by an
inverse demand function P (a1 , a2 ). A firm’s reserves can increase after each
period by some random integer amount, up to a maximal reservoir capacity of
x̄.
The example is solved with an R implementation of the policy elimination algorithm described in Section 5.3. The following parameters are used: maximum
capacity of each firm x̄ = 20, discount factor δ = 32 , inverse demand function
P (a1 , a2 ) = 20 − a1 − a2 , and reserves refill with equal probability by 3 or 4
units each period. Solving this example with 21*21=441 states takes around
30 seconds on a Notebook with 1,20 MHz. Figure 2 illustrates the solution
of the dynamic game by showing the market prices in an optimal collusive
equilibrium as a function of the oil reserves of both firms.
20

Prices under Collusion
20

20

18

Reserves firm 2

15
16

10

14

12
5
10
0

8
0

5

10

15

20

Reserves firm 1

Figure 2: Optimal collusive prices as function of firms’ reserves. Brighter areas
correspond to lower prices.
Sum of punishment payoffs
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Figure 3: Sum of punishment payoffs v̄1 (x) + v̄2 (x). Darker areas correspond
to lower punishment payoffs.
Starting from the lower left corner, one sees that prices are initially reduced
when firms’ water reserves increase. Yet, the upper right corner illustrates that
equilibrium prices are not monotonically decreasing in reserves: once reserves
become sufficiently large, prices decrease again. An intuitive reason for this
observation is that once reserves grow large, it becomes easier to facilitate collusion as deviations from a collusive agreement can be punished more severely
by a credible threat to selling large quantities in the next period.
Figure 3 fosters this intuition. It illustrates the sum of punishment payoffs
v̄1 (x) + v̄2 (x) that can be imposed on players as function of the current state.
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One sees how harsh punishments can be credibly implemented when reserves
are large.

6.2

A Principal-Agent Game with a Durable Good

This example illustrates how our results can be used to easily obtain closed
form solutions in a simple stochastic game that describes a principal agent
relationship. An agent (player 1) can produce a single durable good for a
principal (player 2). If the product has been successfully produced, the state
of the world will be given by x1 and otherwise it is x0 . In state x0 , the agent
can choose production effort e ∈ [0, 1] and the product will be successfully
produced in the next period with probability e. The principal’s stage game
payoff is 1 in state x1 and 0 in state x0 . The agent’s stage game payoff is −ce
where c > 0 is an exogenous cost parameter. For the moment, we assume that
once the product has been produced, the state stays x1 forever.
Perfect monitoring We first consider the case of perfect monitoring. In the
terminal state x1 joint payoffs are given by U (x1 ) = 1. The joint equilibrium
payoff in state x0 in a simple equilibrium with effort e satisfies
U s (e, x0 ) = −(1 − δ)ce + δ(e + (1 − e)U s (e, x0 )) ⇔
δ − (1 − δ)c
e.
U s (e, x0 ) =
δe + (1 − δ)
We assume (1 − δ)k < δ, i.e. it is socially efficient that the agent exerts
maximum effort. In an optimal simple equilibrium, the agent’s punishment
payoff in both states are 0 and the principal’s punishment payoff’s are v2s (x0 ) =
0 and v2s (x1 ) = 1. Using Corrollary (1) one then finds that effort e can be
implemented if and only if
(1 − δ) c ≤ δ 2 (1 − e).

(16)

Condition (16) implies that positive effort can be induced under sufficiently
large discount factors, while it is not possible to induce full effort e = 1 under any given discount factor δ ∈ [0, 1). On first thought, that result seems
surprising since effort costs are linear. The intuition is simple, however. Once
the product has been successfully built, the game is in the absorbing state
x1 . Since payoffs in x1 are fixed, the principal won’t conduct any transfers.
How can the principal credible reimburse the agent for positive effort? This
is only possible with a transfer in the case that the agent has exerted high
effort but the project has not been successful: the probability that the agent
gets reimbursed for the required effort level is thus given by (1 − e). Thus, the
agent cannot be reimbursed for full effort, but there is a positive chance to get
reimbursed for partial effort.
Imperfect Monitoring Consider now imperfect monitoring in the form that
the principal can only observe the realized state. It is straightforward that then
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in every simple equilibrium the agent chooses zero effort and no transfers are
conducted. That is because the principal cannot be induced to make any payments in state x1 and at the same time any transfers by the principal in the
state x0 increase the agent’s incentives not to conduct any effort. This observation illustrates how monitoring imperfections may be much more devastating
in a stochastic game than in a repeated game: in a standard repeated principal agent games with a noisy public signal about the agent’s effort choice,
(approximately) socially optimal effort levels can always be implemented under
sufficiently large discount factors.
Costly punishment Assume now that in state x1 the agent can choose
destructive effort d ∈ {0, 1} where d = 1 has the consequence that the product
is destroyed in the next round while for d = 0 the product remains intact. The
agent incurs costs for destructive efforts of size kd with k ≥ 0.
Since d can be induced from the state transitions, we can assume w.l.o.g. that
d is perfectly observable. It follows from condition (9) in Proposition 5 that
the agent can be induced to destroy the product if and only if
(1 − δ)k ≤ δU s (e, x0 ).

(17)

In an optimal simple equilibrium with d = 1, the principal’s punishment payoffs
satisfy
v2s (d = 1, x0 ) = 0
v2s (d = 1, x1 ) = (1 − δ).
The maximum payment the principal can then be induced to make in state x1
is thus given by
pmax
(x1 ) =
2

δ
1
(1 − (1 − δ)) =
.
1−δ
1−δ

Assume effort e is imperfectly monitored and only the realized state can be
observed. Given pmax
(x1 ), the agent can be induced to implement an effort
2
level e > 0 if and only if
δ
⇔
1−δ
(1 − δ)c ≤ δ 2 .
ce ≤ δe

(18)

Since U s (e, x0 ) is strictly increasing in e, in every optimal simple equilibrium
in which the agent chooses positive effort, we have maximal effort e = 1. The
joint equilibrium phase payoff in state x0 is then given by
U s (e = 1, x0 ) = −(1 − δ)c + δ.
Inserting this payoff into condition (17), we find that high effort can be implemented if and only if
(1 − δ)(δc + k) ≤ δ 2
(19)
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and (18) hold. Hence, if the agent has the opportunity to exert costly effort
to punish the principal after a successful project, full effort provision can be
implemented under sufficiently large discount factors. Note that conditions
(18) and (19) are also necessary and sufficient for the existence of a simple
equilibrium with positive effort in a perfect monitoring variant of the principal
agent game in which only binary effort choices e ∈ {0, 1} are possible.
Optimal penal codes vs grim-trigger punishments The constructed
simple equilibria use optimal penal codes in which the agent uses a punishment that is costly in the current period and that is only conducted because
it is rewarded in the future. In repeated games, simple grim-trigger punishments that punish any deviation by an infinite reversion to a stage game Nash
equilibrium are generally also able to implement cooperative actions given
sufficiently large discount factors. In the current example, a natural variant
of grim-trigger punishments would be to punish any deviation from required
effort or transfers by reverting to the unique MPE of the stochastic game:
e = d = 0 and no transfers. However, such grim-trigger punishments won’t be
able to implement any positive effort by the agent, since the principal could
not be induced to make positive transfers in state x1 . The ineffectiveness of
grim-trigger punishments in this simple example illustrates that for stochastic
games it is particularly useful to have a simple characterization of equilibria
with optimal penal codes.
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Appendix A: Computing Punishment Payoffs in
Policy Elimination Algorithm
This appendix develops a quick algorithm to compute the punishment payoffs
vi (x|Â) and punishment policies âi (Â) in Step 2 of the policy elimination
algorithm described in Section 5.3. The problem cannot be reduced to a simple
Markov decision process, but we show that a nested policy iteration method
exists that searches among possible candidate policies ai in a monotone fashion.
We denote by
ci (a, x, v) = max {(1 − δ) (πi (âi , a−i |x)) + δE[vi (x0 )|x, âi , a−i ]}
âi ∈Ai (x)

player i’s best-reply payoff given that in the current period in state x action
profile a shall be played and continuation payoffs in the next period only
depend on the realized state x0 and are given by vi (x0 ).
The following nested policy iteration algorithm yields an optimal punishment
policy âi (Â).
Algorithm. Nested policy iteration to find an optimal punishment policy
0. Set the round to r = 0 and start with some initial policy a0 ∈ Â
1. Calculate player i’s punishment payoffs vi (.|ar ) given punishment policy
ar by solving the corresponding Markov Decision Process
2. Let ar+1 be a policy that minimizes state by state player i’s best-reply
payoff against action profile ar+1 (x) given continuation payoffs vi (.|ar ),
i.e.
(20)
ar+1 (x) ∈ arg min ci (x, a, vi (.|ar ))
a∈Â(x)
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3. Stop if ar itself solves step 3. Otherwise increment the round r and go
back to step 2.
In Step 2, we update the punishment policy by minimizing state-by-state the
best reply payoffs ci (x, a, vi (.|ar )). This operation can be performed very
quickly. The following result shows that this updating rule causes the punishment payoffs vi (.|ar ) to monotonically decrease in every round.
Proposition 6. Algorithm 2 always terminates in a finite number of periods
yielding an optimal punishment policy ai (Â). The punishment payoffs decrease
in every round (except for the last round):
vis (x|ar+1 ) ≤ vis (x|ar ) for all x ∈ X and
vis (x|ar+1 ) < vis (x|ar ) for some x ∈ X.
The proof heavily exploits monotonicity properties of the contraction mapping
operator that is used to solve the Markov decision process in Step 2. In the
examples we computed, the algorithm typically finds an optimal punishment
policy by examining just a very small fraction of all possible policies. While
one can construct examples in which the algorithm has to check every possible
policy in Â, the monotonicity results suggest that the algorithm typically stops
after a few rounds.

Appendix B: Proofs
Proposition 1, Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 are straightforward and proofs are
omitted.
Proof of Lemma 3: The first sentence follows from the fact that action constraints and payment constraints are weak inequalities and linear in U and v.
The second sentence follows then directly from the Theorem of the Maximum.
Proof of Theorem 1: Denote by Ū (x) the supremum of joint continuation payoffs across all public perfect continuation equilibria starting in state x. Similarly, denote by v̄i (x) the infimum of player i’s continuation payoffs across
all PPE continuation payoffs starting in state x. Denote by ū some payoff
function that satisfies
n
X

ūi (x) = Ū (x)∀x, y

i=1

and

ūi (x) ≥ v̄i (x)∀x, i

Let {Ū (x, m)}∞
m=1 be a sequence of joint PPE continuation payoffs that converges to Ū (x). Let σ̄ e (x, m) be a PPE starting at the action stage in state x
that implements the joint payoff Ū (x, m). Let ᾱe (x, m) denote the first action
profile that is played in σ̄ e (x, m). Let p̂e (.|x, ū, m) denote a payment function that solves (LP-e) for ᾱe (x, m), ū and v̄. That such a payment function
exists follows from Lemma 1. Since {ᾱe (x, m), p̂e (.|x, ū, m)}m is an infinite
sequence in a compact space, there must be a converging subsequence with a
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limit (ᾱe (x), p̂e (.|x, ū)) where ᾱe (x) ∈ A(x). All action, payment and budget
constraints will be satisfied for this limit point, because these constraints are
weak inequalities and continuous in actions and payments. It follows from the
Theorem of the Maximum that p̂e (.|x, ū) solves (LP-e) for ᾱe (x) given ū and
v̄; the corresponding value of (LP-e) satisfies
Û (x, ᾱe (x), ū, v̄) ≥ Ū (x)

(21)

In a similar fashion, we can show that for every player i and every state x
there exists an action profile ᾱi (x) ∈ A(x) and a payment function p̂i (.|x, ū)
that solves (LP-i) for ᾱi (x) given ū and v̄. The corresponding value of (LP-i)
satisfies
v̂i (x, ᾱi (x), ū, v̄) ≤ v̄i (x)
(22)
Let σ̃ be a simple strategy profile with action plan (ᾱk )k as specified above and
a payment plan (p̃k )k that is specified below. Expected continuation payoffs
at the action stage in state x and equilibrium phase of σ̃ are given by
ũi (x) = (1 − δ)πi (ᾱk , x) + δE[−(1 − δ)p̃ei (x0 , y, x) + ũi (x0 )|x, ᾱe ]) (23)
The payments p̃e for the equilibrium phase shall be chosen such that ũi and
p̃e satisfy the transformation specified in Lemma 1 with respect to ū and p̂e :
p̃ei (x0 , y, x) = p̂ei (x0 , y|x, ū) +

ũi (x0 ) − ūi (x0 )
1−δ

(24)

Since ũi is a linear function of the payments p̃i , (24) describes a system of
linear equations with as many as unknowns as equations, i.e. at least one
solution exists. For the punishment phase of each player i, we similarly specify
payments for each player j = 1, ..., n by
p̃ij (x0 , y, x) = p̂ij (x0 , y|x, ū) +

ũj (x0 ) − ūj (x0 )
1−δ

(25)

With these payments, expected continuation payoffs of σ̃ after the action stage
in state x and phase k are then the same as if continuation payoffs were ū and
payments were p̂k , i.e. we have

and

Ũ (x) = Û (x, ᾱe (x), Ū , v̄)

(26)

ṽi (x) = v̂i (x, ᾱi (x), ū, v̄)

(27)

which implies that Ũ (x) ≥ Ū (x) and ṽi (x) ≤ v̄i (x). It follows from Lemma
1 that all action, payment and budget constraints of σ̃ are satisfied, i.e. σ̃
constitutes a simple equilibrium. We thus must have
Ũ (x) = Ū (x) = Û (x, ᾱe (x), Ū , v̄)
and

ṽi (x) = v̂i (x, ᾱi (x), ū, v̄) = v̄i (x)
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It then follows from Proposition 1 that every PPE payoff can be implemented
by varying the upfront transfers of σ̃ and that the payoff set is compact.
Proof of Proposition 2: The set of payment plans that satisfy conditions (ACk), (PC-k) and (BC-k) is compact, i.e. for every state x there exists a maximum level Ū s (x|(αk )k ) of joint equilibrium phase payoffs and a minimum
level v̄is (x|(αk )k ) of player i’s punishment payoffs that can be implemented
with simple equilibria with payment plan (αk )k . The proof now proceeds in
similar steps than the proof for Theorem 1. One can show that there always
exists a payment plan that creates a simple equilibrium that has joint payoffs
of Ū s (x|(αk )k ) and punishment payoffs of v̄is (x|(αk )k ) for all players at the
P
P
same time in all states. By maximizing x∈X ni=1 (usi (x) − vis (x)), we select
a payment plan that solves this problem.
Proof of Proposition 3:The result follows directly from the monotonicity results in Lemma 2 and from the continuity results in Lemma 3.
Proof of Proposition 4: We first show sufficiency. Let p̂k (.|u, x) be the payment
P
function that solves (LP-k) given v and some u satisfying ui (x) = U (x) for
all x. We now choose a payment plan (pk )k such that a simple strategy profile
with (pk )k and action plan (αk )k has equilibrium phase and punishment payoffs
that satisfy usi (x) = ui (x) and vis (x) = vi (x). Such a payment plan is given
by a solution to the following system of linear equations that satisfies the
transformation in Lemma 1
pki (x0 , y, x) = p̂ki (x0 , y|x, u) +

usi (x0 ) − ui (x0 )
∀i, x0 , x, y, k
1−δ

It follows from Lemma 1 that (pk )k and (αk )k form a simple equilibrium.
Necessity is straightforward. If there exists a simple equilibrium with action
plan (αk )k then (LP-OPP) must have a solution. If U and v are the payoffs
corresponding to that solution, conditions (5) and (6) obviously hold true
because the separate problem (LP-e) and (LP-i) impose fewer constraints than
(LP-OPP). 
Proof of Proposition 5:
1. To prove the first result, we show that if there is a solution to (LP-e) then
there is a solution without money burning. Consider the punishment phase
i and the case that no player has deviated in the previous action stage. If a
player j 6= i burns money, she can instead simply not burn it: not burning,
relaxes j’s action constraints while not changing i’s payoff. If player i burns
money, she can instead simply transfer the same amount to player j. Both
arguments also work the equilibrium phase. If some player i is asked to burn
money after she deviated in the previous period, she can simply transfer the
same amount to another player j 6= i. Since for j the deviation of i is a zero
probability event, any such transfers don’t change j’s action constraints.
2. We now prove the second result. Throughout the remaining proof, we
P
assume that u is the payoff vector with ni=1 ui = U and ui ≥ vi ∀i that is used
as argument in problem (LP-k). We denote by
pmax
(x) =
j

1
(uj (x) − vj (x))
1−δ
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the maximum payment that satisfies player j’s payment constraint in state x.
Since deviations are perfectly observed, player i’s incentives to deviate from an
action profile are minimized if whenever she deviates and state x0 realizes she
has to pay pmax
(x0 ). Given such maximum fines, player i’s action constraint
i
in state x and for problem (LP − k) simplifies to




(1 − δ) πi (ak , x) − δE[pki |ak , x] + δE[u|ak , x] ≥
max



ai ∈Ai (x)

(1 − δ)πi (ai , ak−i , x) + δE[vi (x0 )|ai , ak−i , x]



(28)

We now note that a player’s action constraints are weakly stricter than her pay(x0 )
ment constraints in the following sense. If payments satisfy pj (x0 ) = pmax
j
for all resulting states x0 ∈ X then the action constraint (28) becomes
(1 − δ)πi (ak , x) + δE[vi (x0 )|ak , x] ≥
max

ai ∈Ai (x)



(1 − δ)πi (ai , ak−i , x) + δE[vi (x0 )|ai , ak−i , x]



(29)

Obviously, condition (29) either binds exactly or is violated. In problem (LP-i)
it is optimal to choose expected payments for player i as high as possible given
payment constraints and action constraints. Optimal payments for player i
will thus always be such that player i0 s action constraints are exactly binding;
continuation payoffs are thus given by (8).
3. Condition (9) is simply the sum of players’ action constraints (28) given
maximum fines. Hence, (9) is necessary for the existence of solution to (LP-k).
We now show sufficiency. Obviously, for problem (LP-k) there always exist
payments such for all but one freely selected player j 6= k all action and
payment constraints are satisfied. Furthermore, since action constraints are
weakly stricter than payment constraints, we also know that such payments
exist under which the action constraints of all players i 6= j are exactly binding.
If no money burning is used, expected payments of player j in state x satisfy:
− (1 − δ)δE[pj (x0 )|ak , x] =




(1 − δ) Π(ak , x) − πj (ak , x) + δ(U (x) − uj (x))
−

X
i6=j

max {(1 − δ)πi (âi , ak−i , x) + δE[vi (x0 )|âi , ak−i , x]}

âi ∈Ai (x)

(30)

Plugging in these expected transfers into the action constraint for player j for
state x yields condition (9). This means (9) implies that there exist payments
without money burning that satisfy the action constraints for all players in all
states and phases and all payment constraints of all players i 6= j. We now
show that there also exists payments that additionally satisfy the payment
constraints for player j. If no money burning is used, the sum of payment
constraints across all players is always satisfied, since
n
n
X
1 X
0
0
(ui (x ) − vi (x )) =
pmax
(x0 ).
pi (x ) = 0 ≤
i
1 − δ i=1
i=1
i=1

n
X

0

(31)

Assume that given payments satisfy all action constraints and all payment
constraints except for the payment constraints for player j in some realized
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state x0 . (31) then guarantees that there is a set of players J such that the
transfers pj (x0 ) of players j ∈ J can be sufficiently increased and transferred
to player i so that the payment constraints of all players {i} ∪ J are satisfied.
Furthermore, our previous result that for every player i action constraints are
stricter than the payment constraints, implies that there is a set of realized
states X̂ ⊂ X such that player i’s transfers pi (x̂0 ) for all x̂0 can be increased
and given to players j ∈ J such that with this compensation expected transfers
E[pj (x0 )|ak , x] do not change for any player j ∈ J ∪ {i}.
Proof of Proposition 6: Let Cia be a operator mapping the set of punishment
payoffs in itself defined by
Cia (vi )[x] = ci (x, a(x), vi )
It can be easily verified that Cia is a contraction-mapping operator. It follows
from the contraction-mapping theorem that player i’s best-reply payoffs are
given by the unique fixed point of Cia , which we denote by vi (a). This means
vi (a) = Cia (vi (a))

(32)

It is a well known result that the operator Cia is monotone. This means
vi ≤ ṽi ⇒ Cia (vi ) ≤ Cia (ṽi )

(33)

where vi ≤ ṽi is defined as vi (x) ≤ ṽi (x)∀x ∈ X. We denote by [Cia ]k the
operator that applies k times Cia and define its limit by
[Cia ]∞ = lim [Cia ]k .
k→∞

The contraction mapping theorem implies that [Cia ]∞ is well defined and transforms every payoff function v into the fixed point of Cia , i.e.
[Cia ]∞ (v) = v(a)

(34)

Furthermore, it follows from monotonicity of Cia that

and

Cia (vi ) ≤ vi ⇒ [Cia ]∞ (vi ) ≤ vi

(35)

Cia (vi ) < vi ⇒ [Cia ]∞ (vi ) < vi

(36)

where two payoff functions ui and ũi satisfy ui < ũi if ui ≤ ũi and ui 6= ũi .
We now show that for any two policies a and ã the following monotonicity
results hold
Cia (v(a)) = Ciã (v(a)) ⇒ v(a) = v(ã)
Cia (v(a)) > Ciã (v(a)) ⇒ v(a) > v(ã)
v(a)  v(ã) ⇒ Cia (v(a))  Ciã (v(a))

(37)
(38)
(39)

We exemplify the proof for (38). It follows in this order from from (32), the
left part of (38), (35) and (34) that


v(a) = Cia (v(a)) > Ciã (v(a)) ≥ Ciã
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∞

(v(a)) = v(ã).

(37) and can be proven similarly. To prove (39), assume that there is some ã
with Cia (v) ≤ Ciã (v) but ṽ  v. We find


v = Cia (v) ≤ Ciã (v) ≤ Ciã

∞

(v) = ṽ

which contradicts the assumption ṽ  v.
Intuitively, these monotonicity properties of the cheating payoff operator are
crucial for why the algorithm works. If one wants to find out whether a policy
ã can yield lower punishment payoffs for player i than a policy a, one does
not have to solve player i’s Markov decision process under policy ã. It suffices
to check whether for some state x the cheating payoffs given policy ã and
punishment payoffs v(a) are lower than v(a)(x). If this is not the case for any
admissible policy ã then a policy a is an optimal punishment policy, in the
sense that it minimizes player i’s punishment payoffs in every state.
The fixed point condition (32) of the value determination step and the policy
r+1
r
improvement step (20) imply that v r = Cia (v r ) ≥ Cia (v r ). We first establish
that if
r
r+1
v r = Cia (v r ) = Cia (v r ).
(40)
then we have vir = v̂i . For a proof by contradiction, assume that condition
holds for some r but that there exists a policy â such that v(ar )  v(â), i.e.
â leads in at least some state x to a strictly lower best-reply payoff for player
r
i than ar . By (39) this would imply Cia (v r ) ≮ Ciã (v r ). This means that â
must also be a solution to the policy improvement step and since (40) holds,
we then must have
r
Cia (v r ) = Ciâ (v r )
However, (37) then implies that v(ar ) = v(â), which contradicts the assumption v(ar )  v(â). Thus if the algorithm stops in a round R, we indeed have
v R = v̂i .
If the algorithm does not stop in round r, it must be the case that v r =
r
r+1
Cia (v r ) > Cia (v r ). (38) then directly implies the monotonicity result v r >
v r+1 . The algorithm always stops in a finite number of rounds since the number
of policies is finite and there a no cycles because of the monotonicity result.
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